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ABSTRACT
The magnitude and the direction of net international capital flows does not fit neo-¸
classical models. The 50 U.S. states comprise an integrated capital market with very¸
low barriers to capital flows, which makes them an ideal testing ground for neoclassical¸
models. We develop a simple frictionless open economy model with perfectly diversified¸
ownership of capital and find that capital flows between the U.S. states are consistent¸
with the model. Therefore, the small size and "wrong" direction of net international¸
capital flows are likely due to frictions associated with national borders and not due¸





















International capital ows have surged since the early 1990s, creating renewed interest in
their determinants. One salient fact of this recent increase is the small size of net capital
ows relative to gross ows.1 In addition, capital has owed \uphill" from poorer to richer
countries in the last decade, a phenomenon that has manifested itself in recent global imbal-
ances.2 These empirical patterns are at odds with theoretical benchmarks. The goal of this
paper is to demonstrate the viability of the simple neoclassical model in the ideal setting of
fully integrated economies such as the 50 U.S. states. We develop a frictionless open economy
neoclassical model where capital income is fully diversied and show that it ts the data for
U.S. states well, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
The key elements of our model are as follows. Capital income|but not labor income|is
fully diversied between states and total factor productivity (TFP) varies across states and
over time.3 We assume that capital markets are fully integrated in the sense that individuals
can borrow and lend freely across state borders and insure themselves against state-specic
risk by holding a geographically diversied portfolio of assets. Hence, relative investment
is determined by relative productivity levels and relative savings do not play any role in
determining relative investment. The model predicts that capital will ow to fast growing
states from slow growing states and as a result high growth states pay capital income to other
states.4 With persistent productivity shocks, high output|\rich"|states end up being net
debtors more often than not.
Our model delivers the following predictions: 1) income increases less than output in
1high growth states, 2) net dividends converge to zero in the absence of growth shocks,
and 3) high output states tend to pay net dividends. We simulate the model in order to
obtain quantitative predictions and then verify that these results hold using U.S. state-
level data. Consequently, we conclude that the main explanation for the small size and
\wrong" direction of international capital ows is more likely due to \frictions" associated
with national borders|making international nancial markets de facto incomplete|rather
than to inherent deciencies in the simple neoclassical model.5
Testing the implications of the model in a regression framework requires data on interstate
net capital ows. We do not have data on state-level current accounts, but income ows
(\dividends") between states typically reect past net investment ows. However, dividend
payments between states are not directly observed either. In the country-level national
accounts net capital income ows are approximately equal to the dierence between Gross
National Income (\income") and Gross Domestic Product (\output").6 Output is observed
for U.S. states but the state-level equivalent of GNI is not. We use approximations to state-
level GNI based on observed state-level personal income. Thus, the ratio of output to income
(\output/income") is an indicator of net capital income. When the ratio is larger than one,
this indicates a net capital income outow. We derive the predictions of the model for the
output/income ratio and test these predictions.
The output/income ratio has been used before to infer past net capital ows between
U.S. states by Atkeson and Bayoumi (1993a,b) who found large inter-regional net capital
ows within the United States. However, they did not systematically match their ndings
2to a model nor did they study the determinants of state-level capital ows. Of particular
relevance is their nding that personal dividend income is highly correlated across states,
consistent with our assumption that capital ownership is diversied geographically.7
The surge in international asset trade has triggered recent research eorts focussing on
portfolio models of the current account. Starting with the partial equilibrium approach of
Kraay and Ventura (2000), this literature highlights the importance of countries' net external
positions in determining current account balances and hence the pattern of capital ows. A
central result, which has been a source of controversy, is that countries hold a constant ratio
of domestic to foreign capital.8 We contribute to this debate as our model and empirical
results show that portfolio shares follow a mean-reverting process.
In the next section, we derive and simulate theoretical predictions. Section 3 performs
the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Capital Flows in a Neoclassical Growth Model




it ; where Kit is capital in state i and 0 <  < 1. We denote the aggregate capital
stock by Kt. State i's ownership share is it, so that assets owned by state i are itKt with
N
i=1it = 1, where the last equality follows from the assumption that the United States is
a closed economy.9 We can, therefore, also think of Kt as the value of a U.S.-wide mutual
fund.
Under market integration the ex ante gross rate of return to investment is Rt for all
3states|in our simulations, Rt will be the equilibrium market clearing rate of interest. We
assume that capital ownership is fully diversied and risk premiums are negligible. Therefore,
capital will ow to state i until the marginal return to capital equals the U.S.-wide gross













it . Therefore, gross (pre-depreciation) income, GNI, in state i is GNIit =
it RtKt + witLit = it RtKt + (1   )AitK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it RtKt + (1   )GDPit
: (1)
The output/income ratio measures the relative magnitude of net inter-state capital income
ows from a state. If such ows are zero, the ratio is unity; if they are negative, the ratio is
less than unity; and if they are positive, the ratio exceeds unity.
Equation (1) implies that the output/income ratio is a function of output and capital
ownership. Another implication of equation (1), under the assumption that growth in state








where the derivative is evaluated at the point GNIit = GDPit.
Dynamics of Ownership
The law of motion for capital is Kt+1 = (1 )Kt+sGNIt where sGNIt is gross savings,
4s is the savings rate, and  is the depreciation rate. The stock of capital owned by state i in
period t + 1 is itKt (1   ) + sGNIit and the law of motion for the ownership share is
it+1 =
itKt (1   ) + sGNIit
Kt (1   ) + sGNIt
: (3)
In the absence of productivity shocks, with equal populations and productivity levels,
the portfolio shares revert to the mean of 1=N and hence the GDP/GNI ratio reverts to 1
over time, assuming that the saving rate is constant across states. The mechanism is given
as follows: consider a state with a one-time positive productivity shock. This state will see
output increase more than income, but because wages will be higher than in other states,
savings will also be higher. The higher savings will result in higher asset income in the follow-
ing period and the result is gradual convergence of the level of income to the new output level.
Workers and Stock Holders
Not all workers hold assets and some asset holders are not workers (in particular, retirees).
We can predict the marginal impact on the output/income ratio of a change in the number
of workers (without assets) or a change in the number of \stock holders" (asset holders) by
taking derivatives. Consider the symmetric case GDPit = GDPt
Lit
Lt and assume that the
number of shareholders in state i is Sit with Sit = St.10 We evaluate the derivative under
the assumption that each shareholder owns Kt=St shares and the number of shareholders
varies by state. In this case, the ownership share of state i is equal to the fraction of U.S.











We can nd the predicted change in the output/income ratio at the point Lt = St (implying


















where the rst term is a repetition of equation (2).
2.1 Comments on the Model
Our model is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model albeit the assumption of con-
stant savings rates renders it particularly simple to solve. Our goal is to demonstrate that a
bare-bones neoclassical model ts the U.S. data well. A more complicated model might do
an even better job, but we are constrained by the availability of data. In this section, we
discuss three central issues, namely saving, productivity, and capital reallocation.
As an empirical matter, reliable estimates of state-level savings are hard to come by.
Therefore we prefer not to condition our predictions on models of saving. According to
permanent income theory, individuals save a smaller fraction of their income the higher the
expected present value of future income shocks. As argued by Glick and Rogo (1995), the
intertemporal approach to the current account implies that following a \permanent" country-
6specic shock, there will be a current account decit at least as large as the corresponding
rise in investment. Using international data they regress changes in gross investment and
current accounts on the changes in TFP and nd that gross investment reacts stronger
than the current account which is at odds with theory under the assumption of perfect
capital mobility and existence of persistent productivity shocks.11 However, the response of
savings can be justied by productivity shocks that are slowly mean reverting rather than
permanent.12
In our model, because of full diversication and hence no risk premia, relative investment
will be determined by relative productivity with no role for state-specic savings rates.
Hence, both debtor and creditor countries can attract capital on net and run current account
decits if they are hit by positive persistent productivity shocks. If capital ows to high
growth regions we should, everything else equal, see that high output regions run current
account decits and hold negative net asset positions.13 Sometimes poorer regions appear to
be in the \catch-up growth" phase where they grow relatively fast and attract capital from
other regions; an example is the U.S. southern states in the 1950s.14
We now turn to discuss productivity. TFP shocks are the fundamental drivers in our
model although, in our empirical work, a strict technology interpretation of TFP shocks
is misleading and TFP should be interpreted very broadly.15 In particular, relative price
changes, such as oil price shocks that increase the return to capital in oil-rich states, are
an important source of TFP variation, broadly dened, in our data. The crucial condition





7exceeds Rt. For example, consider a case with no literal technology shocks, where consumers
in all states consume the same consumption basket, and the relative price of output sold






We do not imagine machines being dismantled and carted to other states; rather, we
imagine that net investment is higher in states with high TFP and that this can be modeled
as malleable capital when long time intervals are considered. This approach is supported by
Blomstrom et al. (1996), who perform Granger causality tests and show that growth induces
subsequent capital formation more than capital formation induces subsequent growth at the
country level.16
2.2 Regressions with Simulated Data
In order to evaluate the quantitative predictions of the model, we simulate it for N=50
open economies, \states," for T=100 periods (corresponding to years) using a Cobb-Douglas
production function with capital's share,  = 0:33. We set Lit = 1 for all states i and periods
t. For the productivity process, we assume
log(Ait) = (1   ) log(A0) + log(Ait 1) +  it ; (6)
where  is a standard normal innovation, independent across states and periods.





1  = Kt, where Kt is determined at t   1 and




1 : Having found Kit, we nd wit = (1   )AitK
it and calculate
8GNIit = wit + itRtKt. Aggregate GNIt (= GDPt) is then found as GNIt = 50
i=1GNIit:
Finally, we use equation (3) to calculate it+1.
To initialize the process we choose an arbitrary K0 and simulate the model for a number
of years until it converges to a steady-state value. We set the initial level of productivity in
each state A0 = 1 (a normalization) and the initial ownership share of each state i0 = 1=50.
For the parameters that govern the productivity process, we choose  = 0:99 and  = 0:02.
The standard deviation of productivity is chosen to generate state-level output volatility that
match the observed volatility in the data. We use s = 0:20 and  = 0:05. The calibration of
these parameter values is guided by aggregate and state-specic data moments.
We perform cross-sectional regressions using the simulated values for 50 states. We
perform 2 sets of regressions. \Change regressions" consider the change in the output/income
ratio as a function of growth. These regressions are motivated by equation (2) which predict
a clear relationship between the change in the output/income ratio and output growth. This
relationship is the sharpest prediction of the model as it involves only observable variables.
We also estimate \level regressions," where we consider the relationship of the output/ratio
to past output and ownership, motivated by equation (1). Because ownership shares are not
observed the empirical predictions are less sharp and simulations are needed in order to nd
quantitative implications.
We performed 200 regressions (from 200 simulations) and report the average coecients
and the standard deviations across the 200 simulations. Table 1 shows the results of a
regression of the change in the (decade average) output/income ratio from the second-to-last
9decade to the last decade regressed on growth in output over the second to last decade. These
\years" are chosen to match the empirical regressions in Table 5. (The choice of specication
is discussed in the empirical section below.) We consider the predicted coecients for changes
the more important implications of our model. For instantly observed changes our model
predicts a coecient near 0.33 but here we nd a signicant coecient of 0.08|the passing
of time results in a smaller coecient. Column (2) adds the output/income ratio of the
previous decade. We nd a coecient of 0.13 to growth and a coecient to the lagged
output income ratio of {0.44. This implies a half-life for output/income deviations (from the
average of unity) of about 15 years.
Table 2, column (1), displays results from regressing the log average output/income ratio
in the last 20 years on log average output from the 4 preceding years. (As before \years"
are chosen to match the empirical regressions in Table 7.) We nd a statistically signicant
coecient of 0.05 implying that high output states have higher output than income and,
therefore, are net recipient of out-of-state capital. In other words, capital ows to \rich"
states on average. In column (2), we add the lagged log-ownership share. In the actual data
as well as in the simulated data, high output regions tend to have high ownership shares, so to
limit collinearity, we use ownership shares that are averaged over data ve \decades" ago.17
We get a negative signicant coecient of {0.14, implying that states with an ownership
share 1 percent above average will tend have an output/income ratio 0.14 percent below
average 50 years later.
We performed sensitivity analysis by changing parameter values and initial arbitrary
10values. Overall, the results are qualitatively robust|in particular, the results of the change
regressions are very robust. The level regressions are somewhat sensitive to the size of the
productivity shocks (the larger shocks, the larger the coecient to lagged output in Table 2)
and the depreciation rate (typically, smaller coecients with high depreciation).
3 Empirical Analysis
The raw data series were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), unless
otherwise stated. All nominal variables are converted into 2000 prices using the consumer
price index.18 We provide a detailed description of the variables in the data appendix.
State-level GDP, denoted Gross State Product (GSP), is published by the BEA as part of
the U.S. state-level national accounts. GSP is dened as the sum of value added originating in
all industries in the state; thus, it is exactly the state-level equivalent of GDP. GSP numbers
are based on income generated in establishments and the main sources are industrial censuses
such as the census of manufactures. GSP is available for the years 1977{2000. Previously
published, but no longer updated by the BEA, GSP data is available since 1963, but that
data is not fully compatible with the data post 1977 and hence we use this data only in a
descriptive sense.
Our main measure for income is State Personal Income (SPI), which is based mainly
on administrative-records data and on data from censuses and surveys. SPI is derived by
adding personal earnings, government transfers and dividend, interest and rental income and
subtracting contributions to government social insurance. While it might seem preferable
11to use approximate GNI numbers for easier comparison to country-level data, we prefer to
focus on the results based on simple SPI since a large number of imputations are needed to
approximate of GNI. In the appendix we show the relationship between GNI and GDP in the
aggregate U.S. National Income and Product Accounts. We discuss the calculation of GSP
and SPI in detail as well as several approximations to GNI that are used to demonstrate
robustness of our results to dierent calculations of \income."
3.1 The Empirical Output/Income Ratio
We calculate the output/income ratio for each U.S. state, year-by-year, which allows us to
study the patterns of inter-state capital income ows over time. The variables SPI and GSP
contain aggregate (U.S.-wide) components|in particular, the burgeoning U.S. balance-of-
payments decits|that may vary over time and aect the output/income ratio for individual
states. These aggregate eects are not of interest to us in the context of inter-state capital






SPIt = i SPIit; GSPt = i GSPit :
The ratio Output=Incomeit captures state i's output/income ratio in year t relative to the aggre-
gate U.S. output/income ratio.
123.2 Graphical Evidence: 1963{2000
Figure 1 shows the output/income ratio and the growth rates for eight U.S. Census regions
relative to the average (normalized to unity) across states. We aggregate to regions in order
to get a manageable amount of graphs. The Southwest region had relatively high growth in
the 1960s while the Great Lakes and New England regions had relatively low growth. For
New England, this situation rapidly reversed in the 1980s while the Great Lakes regions only
slowly recovered to reach the middle of the eld by year 2000. The gure also reveals that
New England, the Mid East, and the Great Lakes regions consistently have lower output
than income, while other regions exhibit higher output than income. The general pattern
corresponds well with the historical pattern of high output and income in the central and
Northeastern states around the turn of the century|see North (1961). Part of this income
is likely to have been invested in other regions, resulting in capital income ows from those
regions in the later part of the 20th century.
A signicant change in the output/income ratio relative to other regions is found for
the Great Lakes. This region saw a steady decrease in the ratio throughout the 1960s and
1970s moving from above to below average.19 Another signicant change is the decline in the
output/income ratio for the Southwest at the same time as the output/income ratio increased
in New England. These patterns are exactly what our model would predict, conditional on
the growth patterns. The Great Lakes region throughout our sample was a laggard in
terms of relative growth. This region should, according to our model, have been a net
supplier of capital to other regions and, consequently, have experienced a slowly declining
13output/income ratio|exactly as we observe. New England, on the other hand, experienced
a rapid reversal of fortune in output growth in the 1980s (the \Massachusetts miracle") and
the output/income ratio of New England increased rapidly. The pattern for the Southwest
is the opposite of that found for New England which is also consistent with our model.
The large changes in oil prices that occurred during the period 1973{74 and 1979{87 are
clearly visible in Figure 1. The output/income ratio of the Southwest region, which contains
most of the major oil-producing states, increases due to the oil price hikes in the 1970s and
then declines steeply in the years following the Iranian revolution in 1979.
Figure 2 explores directly if oil price spikes were reected in changes in the output/income
ratio for states with high output of oil (\oil-states"). We plot the average world price of crude
oil and the average output/income ratio for the oil-states Alaska, Louisiana, and Wyoming
for the years 1963{2000. There is a clear pattern with the output/income ratio increasing
following (with about a three years lag) increases in the price of oil and vice versa when the
oil price falls. This pattern is consistent with oil exploration having been nanced by other




The graphical evidence reects the historical developments document by Romans (1965).
He constructs state-level \current accounts" for U.S. states for 1953 and 1957 and nds that
investment minus saving (i.e., net capital inows) was very large and positive for southern
14states and oil states in the 1950s.20 One may notice from Figure 1 that even during the
period of the mid-1980s where the growth rate of New England was about twice the national
average, the output/income ratio for New England stayed below unity. This is consistent
with our model when net capital ows are large and New England was a net supplier of
capital to other states in the 1950s and remained a net creditor at the beginning of the 1980s
(corresponding to an above average value of i in the model).
In agreement with our model, states with large negative values of saving minus investment
in the 1950s tend to be the states with high output/income ratios in the 1980s and 1990s, as
shown by Kalemli-Ozcan, Turan, and Srensen (2008), who also argue that the \catch up"
growth of the 1950s and 1960s mainly was over by the late 1980s.
3.3 Specication of Regressions
We estimate specications similar to those of Tables 1 and 2 using actual data.21 We t
cross-sectional regressions to data averaged over long time spans in order to minimize the
potential eects of business cycles and measurement errors. In choosing the interval length
we face a trade-o. For long enough intervals, adjustment costs in investments can be taken
to be negligible and business cycle eects will average out.22 However, even if there is ample
evidence that (relative) productivity shocks are persistent, these shocks do not last forever
and we may obtain higher variation in growth rates if we consider shorter intervals.
The main regressors for the change regressions are output growth, the lagged out-
put/income ratio, and growth of population and retirees. Ideally, we would like to include
15stock-holders but retirees are, per denition, not in the labor force and, usually, hold assets.
Based on equation (5) we expect that the output/income ratio changes with the normalized
number of retirees at a similar rate as it changes with growth, albeit with a negative sign.23
Our model is couched in terms of stock holders with average assets and labor force with
no assets but the data does not provide such details. However, dierences in population
growth are mainly due to migrants and migration (especially when controlling in the regres-
sions for the number of retirees) is dominated by young workers without assets. Therefore,
based on equation (5), we expect the output/income ratio to change with migration with
a proportionality factor similar to that of growth and with an identical sign.24 However, if
migrants bring some assets the coecient will be smaller|if migrants bring average assets
the coecient to population growth would be near zero. Similarly, if retirees hold less assets
than the average individual we would expect a coecient smaller than that of growth and
vice versa if retirees hold more assets.25
For the level regressions the main regressor is lagged output per capita. Reliable mea-
sures of net ownership are not available, so we examine whether indicators of historical
wealth predict current output/income ratios. As our measure of historical wealth, we use
the logarithm of the per capita value of dividend and interest income by state, averaged over
1939{1949.26 We have access to this data since 1929 and we prefer values that are distant
from the income data used to calculate the current output/income ratio and not too close to
the 1977{1980 period to avoid high collinearity with the output data. For that reason, and
in order to avoid the nancial upheavals of the Great Depression, we chose the 1939{1949
16sample. The results are not very sensitive to exactly which sample is chosen, except that
the coecient to this variable is smaller if we use the data from the 1930s.
We include other controls that are not present in the model, but are important in reality:
oil deposits are highly concentrated in relatively few states that likely obtain a large fraction
of the required capital from outside sources|this is most clearly observed in Alaska where
the large multinational oil companies have made large investments.27 We do not have direct
measures of the value of natural endowments of oil and minerals, so we approximate it for
each state by the share of the gross product of the oil and mineral extraction sector in total
GSP averaged over averaged over 1977{1980. In order to dampen the impact of outliers, we
use the transformation log(1 + x) for the oil share. As a measure of the number of retirees,
we use the share of residents aged 65 and above.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
In Table 3, we tabulate per capita dividend and interest income by state averaged over
1939{1949 (no data available for Hawaii and Alaska), GSP growth per capita averaged over
1981{1990, GSP per capita averaged over 1977{1980 and the output/income ratio averaged
over 1981{2000. The table reveals very large geographical dierences in dividend and interest
income, with the Northeastern states displaying much higher levels than Southern states.
Delaware is an extreme outlier. GSP 1977{1980 also shows high variation with Alaska having
an extremely high value of about 63,000 dollars per capita. Next highest is Wyoming|
another oil state|at 43,000. These oil states also exhibit the highest output/income ratios.
17The lowest ratio is found for Florida, which reects capital income received by retirees who
are no longer in the work force.
Table 4 reports the mean, maximum, minimum, and standard errors (across the 50 states)
of the output/income ratio and all the regressors. The output/income ratio has a mean of
about 1 by construction and has a standard deviation of 0.12.28 This is a large amount
of variation because a value of 1.12 means that 12 percent of value produced shows up as
income in other states on net. GSP 1977{1980 also shows large variation with the value of
the output of the most productive state being more than 3 times that of the least productive
state. GSP growth from 1981 to 1990 has a standard deviation of 15 percent, which means
that several states grew more than 1.5 percentage point per year faster than the average
state during that decade. There are large dierences in the change in number of retirees
and, in particular, population growth across states.
3.5 Results from Empirical Regressions
Change Regressions
Table 5 explores whether the change in the output/income ratio is explained by per capita
output growth and lagged output/income ratios and whether the estimated coecients are
similar to those obtained from regressions on the simulated data.29 The regressions are
performed for 47 states because we do not have dividend and interest income for Alaska and
Hawaii, and Delaware is very atypical. Alaska is also very atypical, with an extremely high
share of GDP due to oil-extraction.
18The eect of (lagged) GSP growth from 1980 to 1990 is statistically signicant and
this variable alone explains 41 percent of the variation in the output/income ratio. In
autarky, the output/income ratio would be constant and equal to 1.0 and no regressors
would be signicant. The signicant positive coecient to lagged GSP growth supports
our interpretation that an increase in TFP brings about growth and capital inows. The
estimated coecient of about 0.3 implies that a state which from 1980 to 1990 grew 10
percent faster than the average state (1 percent faster during the 1980s at the annual rate)
would have an output/income ratio that would be 0.03 higher in the 1990s than in the
1980s.30 While we are not able to run exactly the same regression as those Glick and Rogo
(1995) discussed earlier (due to the fact that we cannot calculate the Solow residual), our
results nonetheless indicate that interstate capital movements are much better described by
the frictionless model than international capital movements.
We can get a rough order of magnitude of the net capital income ows involved as follows:
the average per capita output of a state over our sample is about 30,000 dollars. An increase
in the output/income ratio of 0.03 corresponds to 900 dollars worth of capital income being
paid by residents of the average state to other states, annually. If this increase is mainly
caused by a change in net ownership rather than a surge in productivity, we can expand on
the quantication. If the return to capital is (say) 10 percent, this would imply that capital
in the order of 9,000 dollars per capita were nanced on net by other states.
In the second column of Table 5, we add (lagged) output/income from 1981 to 1990. This
renders the coecient to growth smaller at 0.09 while the coecient to lagged output/income
19takes a value of {0.42, which implies a half-life for the reversion of the output/income ratio
to unity of 15 years. These values are very close to those found by simulating the theoretical
model and regressing on simulated data (see Table 1).
In the third column, we add the rate of population growth. The estimated coecient to
population growth is 0.08 with a t statistic of 1.83. This coecient is identical to that of
growth which is exactly the prediction of the model if migrants arrive with little assets.31
In the last column, we add the change in the number of retirees normalized by pop-
ulation. This estimated coecient is negative, as predicted, although the point estimate
is much larger than predicted. However, the coecient is not precisely estimated and not
signicantly dierent from 0.
Change Regressions{Panel Specication
We show the results of panel regressions where the data has been averaged over fewer
years|these regressions provide more degrees of freedom although we expect the model
to be too simple to match, say, annual data. In Table 6, we show regressions where each
period is an average over 10-year intervals, 7-year intervals, and 5-year intervals, respectively.
Column (1) repeats the last column of Table 5 for easy reference.
Column (2) displays the results for 7-year intervals which doubles our number of data
points. The estimated coecient to lagged growth is larger and very close to the predicted
size from the simulated data. In this larger sample, this coecient is now strongly signi-
cant. The coecient to the lagged ratio measures how much the output/income ratio would
20revert towards unity, ceteris paribus, during one time period. When the length of the time
interval becomes shorter this coecient should become smaller and this is what we nd. The
estimates imply similar half-lives as those for the rst column for the speed of reversion of the
output/income ratio to unity. The coecient to population growth declines with the interval
length which may be due to limited variation in population growth at shorter intervals. The
estimated value in column (2) is still consistent with our model and statistically signicant.
The coecient to changes in number of retirees declines but this coecient is numerically
larger than predicted and now clearly insignicant. For the 5-year intervals, reported in
column (3), the coecients to lagged output and the lagged output/income ratio are still of
the correct size and signicant while the population and retirees variables now are very far
from being signicant.
We veried that the panel regressions do not give meaningful results at higher frequen-
cies. This is to be expected because we ignore business cycle variations and adjustment costs
in our model. All in all, the results of the panel regressions are robust to the choice of period
length|when it is 5 years or longer|and are consistent with our model.
Level regressions
The level regressions are presented in Table 7. Column (5) displays the results for our
main specication, but in order to evaluate the impact of individual regressors as well as
robustness, we show in column (1) the regression of the output/income ratio on (a constant
and) Log Average GSP 1977{1980 and add regressors one-by-one in the remaining columns
21in the order in which we found the regressors to be of interest a priori.
In column (1), Log Average GSP 1977{1980 is statistically signicant at conventional
levels. This variable explains 34 percent of the variation in the dependent variable according
to the R2 and the coecient is positive. A positive sign is consistent with capital owing to
productive states with high output. The coecient is about 0.3, which implies that a state
with output 10 percent above average has a ratio of output/income 3 percent above average.
Since the output/income ratio is 1 on average this implies that a state that produces 50
percent more than the U.S. average is predicted to have an output/income ratio of about
1.15, which means that approximately 15 percent of the state's output accrues to income in
other states. Thus, the estimated coecient is economically large and meaningful. Compared
to the estimate from simulated data the coecient to GSP 1977-1980 is signicantly larger;
however the result matches the qualitative nding of our simulations that capital tends to
ow to high output states.
Dividend and interest income, added in column (2), predicts the current output/income
ratio negatively, as predicted, with a very high t-statistic even though the historical variable
refers to observations more than 50 years ago. The estimated coecient implies that states
with a 10 percent higher than average level of interest and dividend income in the 1940s
has an output/income ratio that is almost 1 percent lower today. If states with relatively
high income in the past invested their savings in states with high total factor productivity,
this is what we would expect to nd. One might nd it surprising that the eect is as
long lasting as this result indicates but in our regression using simulated date we also found
22ownership shares 50 years in the past to be highly signicant. (We can't compare the actual
coecients because the historical dividend and interest income data doesn't correspond
exactly to ownership shares.)
The coecient to oil share, in column (3), is likewise highly statistically signicant.
The inclusion of this variable lowers the coecient to GSP 1977{1980 somewhat relative
to column (2), but this is exactly what our model would lead us to believe: an oil price
shock is a direct measure of productivity of capital in the \oil states." The impact of oil,
as measured from the regression, is large|the coecient of about 0.56 implies that a state,
such as Wyoming, with a fraction of oil in GDP of 0.25, has an output/income ratio of 1.14,
ceteris paribus, implying that 14 percent of output shows up as income in other states due
to the eect of this variable alone. Wyoming's output is on the order of 40,000 dollars per
capita, and 14 percent of that is about 6,000 dollars, which|if we assumed a rate of return
of 10 percent, would imply that capital in the oil-extraction sector in the amount of 60,000
dollars per capita is owned by out of state residents. While this number is based on several
imputations and not likely to be exact, it highlights that on average the amount of out-of-
state capital invested in oil-extraction (capital that is installed in Wyoming but owned by
other states) is very large.
Adding percent retirees, in column (4), we nd a negative signicant coecient in line
with our model. This supports the notion that retirees receive income from savings but
contribute little to output. This coecient is also large in economic terms. A state like
Florida has almost 50 percent more retirees than average and our results predict that Florida
23has an output/income ratio 5 percent below average because of the large number of retirees
in the state.
3.6 Robustness: Measures of Income and Further Controls
Measuring income
The validity of our interpretations is highly dependent on the dierence between output
and our income variable being a reasonable approximation to net capital income from other
states, so we nd it important to demonstrate that our main results are robust to reasonable
alternative ways of calculating our income variable.
A simple modication of SPI that may make the data correspond better to GNI is to use
SPI minus federal transfers, rather than simply SPI. The transfers included in SPI involve
redistribution (typically) from richer to poorer individuals and, in particular, redistribution
from younger to older individuals. A second modication, which is the closest approximation
to \state-level GNI," is to calculate \state income," which is the income that would have been
available for consumption by the residents of the state had there been no scal intervention
on the part of the federal government following the methodology of Asdrubali, Srensen,
and Yosha (1996). We approximate GNI as \state income" plus retained corporate earnings.
Retained corporate earnings are not available by state and we impute the state-level numbers
from aggregate data.32 One last modication, that will make the dierence between SPI and
GSP correspond more closely to the capital income component of factor income ows (while
making it less similar to GNI) is to subtract from the SPI of state i the (net) income that
24commuters living in state i earn in other states, since commuter's income is equivalent to
the foreign earnings of country's residents. We are able to do so using the \adjustment
for residence" data from the BEA. This adjustment is equal to the wage income earned
by residents of state i that work in other states (not i) minus the wage income earned by
residents of other states (not i) that work in state i. Thus, it is the wage component of a
state's \foreign" (from other states) net factor income.33
In Table 8, we explore whether the level regressions are sensitive to the precise deni-
tion of \income" in the denominator of the output/income ratio. Overall, the estimates
are quite robustly estimated, with the signs and relative magnitudes showing little variation
across the columns. Column (1) replicates the fourth column of Table 7. In column (2),
personal income is adjusted for federal transfers. In this column, the estimated impact of
retirees in the population becomes statistically insignicant which indicates that a large part
of the income of retirees consists of federal transfers (notably social security and medicare).
In column (3), we adjust personal income for cross-state commuters' wage income. This
adjustment lowers the coecients to dividend and interest income and GSP 1977{1980, al-
though these regressors are still statistically signicant. One might argue that this choice of
income data ts the model more directly and the lower coecient estimated for this choice
is actually closer to that found using simulated data. In column (4), approximate GNI is
used rather than personal income but the estimated coecients are quite similar to those of
column (1) except that the fraction of retirees is not statistically signicant|likely because
federal transfers are not part of approximate GNI. Overall, our results are robust to these
25dierent denitions of income with some adjustments actually making the results closer to
the simulation benchmark. The change regressions give results that are even more robust to
the denition of income and we do not display the results here.34
Additional Controls
For further robustness check, we consider the following variables whose inclusion in the
regressions do not change the results and for which details are therefore not tabulated.
Geography: Historically, the northern states were the seat of U.S. industrialization and
much wealthier than the south. Anecdotal evidence suggests that capital has moved to the
U.S. South as labor productivity was catching up with the North due to improved education
as described by, e.g., Connolly (2003) and Caselli and Coleman (2001). We dene a dummy
variable, which takes the value 1 for New England, Mid-East, and Great Lakes and 0 for
other regions.35
Sectoral shares other than oil: Historically, agricultural areas have often been laggards
in terms of TFP growth, but this may not be true in recent periods for the United States.
We include the share of agriculture in GSP in the same way as oil and mineral extraction.
We further include the share of manufacturing in GSP.
Human capital: Residents in states with a relatively high number of educated individuals
may have higher output relative to their income if individuals with college degrees (partially)
nanced their student loans from savings in other states or human capital may be correlated
with TFP. We use human capital measured as the number of college graduates in a state
26relative to population in 1989 (the rst available year for this variable).36
4 Conclusion
In spite of the surge in international capital ows in the last decade their magnitude is still
below what typical models predict and they go in the \wrong" direction. Recent theoretical
work attempting to better match the real world data has shifted the attention to portfolio
models of the current account.
We adopt a dierent approach. We develop a simple (constant savings rate) dynamic
general equilibrium model with persistent productivity shocks and full diversication of
capital income. In this model, relative investment is determined by relative productivity,
independently of relative savings. Our model predicts|as the new portfolio models|that
net foreign ownership positions are mean-reverting. Essential for our result is the assumption
that capital is fully diversied such that net ows are not primarily determined by risk
considerations.
An advantage of our framework is that it is easily related to the data. We test the model
using data from the U.S. states. The model predicts that capital ows to fast growing states
from slow growing states and as a result high growth states pay capital income to other
states. With persistent productivity shocks high output|\rich"|states end up being net
debtors.
At the country level, foreign asset and liability positions in the OECD has increased at
a remarkable rate in the 1990s. Nonetheless, almost all countries hold amounts of foreign
27assets below the level of GDP (with Ireland being a notable exception).37 Why foreign asset
holdings are \too low" is one of the biggest puzzles in international nance. Our evidence
suggests that capital ows and ownership patterns across U.S. states are consistent with a
simple frictionless neoclassical model. Therefore, the small size and \wrong" direction of net
international capital ows is likely due to frictions associated with national borders.
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30Notes
1Obstfeld and Taylor (2005) characterize 1990s as the era of limited \development nance"
relative to \diversication nance."
2As stressed by Lucas (1990), capital should ow from rich to poor countries according the
Solow model when capital markets are integrated and the level of total factor productivity
is constant across countries and over time.
3The literature provides evidence that labor mobility is not so fast as to instantly equalize
wages across states. Bernard et al. (2005) show that there are signicant skilled-wage
dierences across states which implies low levels of net migration. Bound and Holzer (2000)
nd that imperfect mobility of unskilled workers in the United States contributed to increased
income inequality in the 1980s.
4More precisely, capital pays capital income in the form of dividends, interest, and rents
to individuals in other states and across and within multi-state companies. Capital income
ows to and from other states also provide risk sharing and our results complement studies
such as Asdrubali, Srensen, and Yosha (1996): they nd that state-level income is about
40 percent insured against output shocks.
5Examples of frictions associated with borders are explicit barriers to investment or factors
aecting investors ex post returns such as bad institutions (corruption and rule of law), and
sovereign risk; see, for example Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2008) and Reinhart
and Rogo (2004).
6The dierence between Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Income is net factor
31income which includes net earnings of domestic residents abroad (not based on citizenship).
However, foreign earnings of domestic residents are usually fairly small compared to capital
income.
7At the country level capital ows are usually directly observed, but Bertocchi and Canova
(2002) use the output/income ratio to infer past net inows of capital to former African
colonies where the historical capital ows data of interest are not observed.
8According to Kraay and Ventura (2000) capital ows are caused by portfolio growth
through changes in wealth. In their model countries invest the marginal unit of wealth as the
average unit such that portfolio shares are constant. More recent papers, such as Devereux
and Sutherland (2006) and Tille and van Wincoop (2008), focus on general equilibrium
eects and show that international capital ows can be broken down into a portfolio growth
component, associated with savings, and a portfolio reallocation component, associated with
changes in expected risk and returns.
9The assumption that the United States is a closed economy is not likely to aect our
empirical results since our regressions control for aggregate U.S.-wide eects.
10Each shareholder will own itKt=Sit shares.
11Gruber (2000) even nds no responsiveness of the current account to real growth rates
for a panel of OECD countries during 1975{2000.
12More precisely, "permanent" shocks refer to the case where income is well described by a
time series model with a unit root where permanent income rises at least as much as current
income. The simplest case is that of a random walk where shocks to current income equals
32shocks to permanent income. Since a random walk model for (OECD) country-specic shocks
cannot be statistically rejected the nding of larger responses of investments than current
accounts constitutes a puzzle. However, time series tests can not separate random walks
from mean reverting AR(1) processes with a coecient to lagged productivity very close to
unity. If income is mean reverting savings will increase following a positive shock.
13Kraay and Ventura (2000) develop a model where investment risk is high and diminishing
returns are weak. Their model implies that positive productivity shocks lead to decits in
debtor countries and surpluses in creditor countries. In our model, because of full diversi-
cation and no risk premia, relative investment will be determined by relative productivity
with no role for savings. Hence, both debtor and creditor countries can attract capital on
net if they hit by positive productivity shocks.
14Note that Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) and Prasad et al. (2007) nd exactly the
opposite in a developing country context; i.e., they nd a positive correlation between current
account and growth and that capital goes to less productive countries.
15For example, including taxes, insurance, cost of heating/cooling, transportation, endow-
ments of oil or minerals, agglomeration benets etc. to the extent that these impact on the
marginal return to capital investment.
16We checked empirically that for OECD countries the level of TFP (identied as the
Solow-residual) is positively correlated with the level of capital (both averaged over 1970{
2000) and that the change in TFP and the change in capital from 1970{1975 to 1976{2000
also are positively correlated. The correlations are 0.21 and 0.37, respectively.
3317More precisely we average over periods 39{49 where the left-hand side is averaged over
periods 81{100.
18A quantity index for real GDP-growth is available for states but our specication captures
the eect of, for example oil-price variation on capital ows, which we would substantially
miss if we used quantity indices.
19We don't display further details, but a closer study reveals this pattern to mainly be
driven by Michigan, likely due to the car industry in Detroit attracting signicantly less
capital after 1970 than it did earlier.
20It would be a major challenge to construct state-level current accounts today. Romans
picked the two cycle-peak years of 1953 and 1957. His total investment estimates for each
state are calculated by aggregating investment in manufacturing, mining, railroads, other
transportation, public utilities, communications, agriculture, and construction. He uses an-
nual surveys for some industries and balance sheets of companies (railways, utilities, etc.)
for others. For industries where neither is available, he imputes from aggregate investment
gures utilizing state-level wages and salaries for that particular industry. His saving esti-
mates are based on state-level data, when available, on currency and bank deposits, saving
and loan shares, private insurance and pension reserves, consumer debt, securities loans,
mortgages, and bank debt, and involves a large number of imputations.
21We leave out Alaska, Hawaii and Delaware, in order to be consistent with the level
regressions.
22We avoid using overlapping samples for the regressor (output) and the dependent variable
34(the output/income ratio) for the simple reason that output is used in the numerator of this
ratio and measurement error would lead to a spurious positive correlation of output with the
output/income ratio.
23Equation (5) contains the term  dS=L or S=L in discrete time. If S = Retirees
+ Other Asset Holders, the coecient to Retirees=L is expected to be  , even if the
contribution from unobserved Other Asset Holders/L goes into the error term.
24The correlation between population growth and migration across states in the 1990s is
0.96.
25For example, if each retiree holds 50 percent of the assets of an average stock holder the
eective change in S due to retirees would be only 0.5 times the change in number of retirees.
The impact on the output/income ratio according to the model would then be  0:5.
26The historical dividend and interest income data was made available to us by the BEA.
The BEA publishes the sum of dividend, interest, and rent income, together with other
income data, going back to 1929. We prefer to use data that does not include rental income,
because this type of income is mostly imputed rental income of locally used and owned
property.
27Alaska is not included in the regressions. Including Alaska would make the results more
signicant.
28The mean is not exactly equal to 1 due to normalization by the aggregate rather than
the average U.S-wide values.
29We include a constant in the regression so the estimated eect of, say, output growth can
35be interpreted in line with the model prediction for a change in output keeping the aggregate
constant.
30For example, North Carolina's per capita GDP grew 13 percent faster than average GDP
over the 1980s.
31We attempted to also include as a regressor the rate of net inter-state migration as a
percent of state population 1975 1980 in order to directly examine the issue of migration.
The migration variable is, however, so closely correlated with population growth that we
obtained non-sensible results due to multi-collinearity. Substituting the population growth
rate with net inter-state migration gives very similar results.
32See the data appendix for details.
33A dierent approach is to use direct estimates of net external assets for U.S. states 1971{
2001 imputed by Duczynski (2000). These estimates are based on personal dividend, interest,
and rental income. Personal dividend income constitutes only about 5 percent of total
personal income|a fraction much lower than the share  (typically 0.33) of output accruing
to capital. The resulting estimates of net capital income ows may well underestimate the
extent of net capital income ows for some states because capital income ows between
(or within) rms in dierent states may never enter personal property income. In spite of
these dierences, using Duczynski's data in regressions similar to the ones reported result in
qualitatively similar results, although the exact coecients estimated can not be compared|
see the working paper version of this paper (NBER WP #11301) for details.
34The change regressions show almost no sensitivity to the denitions of income and we do
36not display the details here. The details are available in the working paper version (NBER
WP #11301) of this article.
35We constructed this dummy variable after experimenting with dummy variables for all
regions in multivariate regressions including our other regressors. The estimated eects were
consistent with these three regions being dierent from the remaining regions. This result,
of course, corresponds to the fact that these are the three regions with low output/income
ratios.
36All the robustness exercises are available from www.uh.edu/skalemli and on request.
37Typical neoclassical models imply that an average state should hold foreign capital in an
amount of about 3 times GDP.
37Appendix A: Relation between GDP and GNI of the United States.
U.S. GDP (Gross value of production physically in the United States)
+ Income from U.S. owned direct investment in other countries
{ Income of foreign owned direct investment in the United States
+ Income from U.S. owned portfolio investment in other countries
{ Income of foreign owned portfolio investment in the United States
+ Income from U.S. government investment in other countries
{ Income of foreign investment in United States government assets
+ Wage and salary earned in other countries by residents of the United States
{ Wage and salary earned in the United States by residents of other countries
+ Taxes on production and imports (collected by the United States from foreign companies)
{ Taxes on production and imports (collected by foreign governments from U.S. companies)
= U.S. GNI (Gross value of production owned by U.S. residents)
+ Subsidies { Indirect business taxes (domestic)
{ Corporate saving
{ Net interest
+ Personal interest income
{ Contributions for social insurance
+ Government transfers to persons
= Personal Income
38Notes: (i) Residents of the United States contribute to U.S. GNI whether they are citizens
of the Unites States or not and, while the number of foreign citizens in the United States is
large, the total wage and salary of foreign residents in the United States is fairly small (less
than 4 percent of total U.S. income payments to foreign countries in 2002).
(ii) Government investments abroad are mainly ocial currency reserves, while government
liabilities are mainly treasury securities. For further details, see OECD (1993),\System of
National Accounts Glossary 1993" and BEA (2003), \Preview of the 2003 Comprehensive
Revision of the National Income and Product Account," Survey of Current Business, June
2003.
39Data Appendix
GSP: State-level GDP, denoted Gross State Product (GSP), is published by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA). GSP is derived as the sum of value added originating in all
industries in the state, thus it is exactly the state-level equivalent of GDP. See Beemiller and
Downey (2001).
GSP is calculated from the income side of the accounts and contains three components:
compensation of employees; taxes on production and imports (TOPI); and gross operating
surplus (including noncorporate income). \Compensation of employees" consists mostly of
employee wages and salaries disbursements; to keep consistency with the rest of the GSP
components the BEA adjusts these disbursements to reect production; i.e., when labor
services were employed, rather than when they were actually paid. For most industries and
GSP components, the estimates are based on establishment data (rather than company data)
by state. Thus, GSP is calculated on a \when accrued, where accrued" basis.
GSP estimates are available for 1977{2000. GSP data exists for 1963{1976 as well, but
is based on a dierent methodology which is inconsistent with the 1977{2000 estimates.
SPI: State-level Personal Income (SPI) is also published by the BEA. SPI is dened as
the income received by, or on behalf of, all the residents of the state and is designed to be
conceptually and statistically consistent with the U.S. national estimates of personal income.
The SPI estimates are primarily based on administrative-records data and on data from
censuses and surveys. The data from administrative records (like Federally-administered
transfer programs) may originate either from the recipients of the income or from the source
40of the income; for example, federal transfers may be reported by the federal government
or by the recipient states or individuals. The data from censuses is mainly collected from
the recipient of the income. Some data is reported and recorded by the recipient's place of
work rather than by the recipient's place of residence. Therefore, adjustments are made to
the data in order to reect the recipient's place of residence. Most adjustments are directly
applied to the series that the BEA publishes, but the largest adjustment, \Adjustment for
residence" of earnings is reported separately.
SPI is derived as SPI=Earnings by place of work { Contributions for government social
insurance (by employee and employer)+ Adjustment for residence+ Dividends, interest, and
rent+ Personal current transfer receipts.
Persons (from \personal income") consist of individuals, nonprot institutions that serve
individuals, private non-insured welfare funds, and private trust funds. The wage component
of SPI takes into account cross-state commuters, so that the wages of persons residing in a
particular state but working elsewhere (another state, Canada or Mexico), even temporarily,
are included in that state's personal income; see \net commuters' income" description below.
Other components of SPI, like estimates of non-farm proprietors' income and of contributions
for government social insurance by the self-employed are derived from source data that
is reported by the tax-ling address of the recipient. This address is usually that of the
proprietor's residence; therefore, the data is, in principle, recorded by place of residence.
Thus, SPI is dened on a \when earned, where earned" basis. SPI is available for our entire
sample.
41The dierence between SPI and GSP: Conceptually, the main dierence between GSP
and SPI is that while GSP is dened on a \when accrued, where accrued" basis, SPI is
dened on a \when earned, where earned" basis. The methodology of estimating these series
reect the dierence. This means that they are estimated using dierent data sources: GSP
estimates are based on payrolls from establishment data, while SPI estimates are based on
income from administrative-records and censuses. So although both are measured form the
income side they are based on dierent data.
A few examples may clarify this dierence. Suppose a machine produces widgets in
Wisconsin. The output of that machine minus the cost of its inputs will be recorded as
part of Wisconsin's GSP. But if the rm that operates the machine is partially owned by
someone that lives in Ohio, where he or she reports dividend income for tax purposes, then
this dividend income will show up in Ohio's SPI. Now suppose that the machine needs a
worker to operate it. The workers wage is accrued to Wisconsin's GSP, but if he or she lives
in Iowa, the salary will show up in Iowa's SPI.
Federal Transfers: This series is the sum of 11 dierent series, each of which we identify
as measuring transfers from the U.S. federal government to individuals or state-specic
institutions (typically governments).1
Net Commuters' Income: This series is denoted \Adjustment for Residence" by the BEA
1The series|published by the BEA and available for our entire sample|are: \Old age, survivors and
disability insurance payments," \Railroad retirement and disability payments," \Workers' compensation
payments (Federal and State)," \Medical payments,"\Supplemental security income (SSI) payments," \Food
stamps," \Other income maintenance," \Unemployment insurance benet payments," \Veterans' benets
payments," \Federal education and training assistance payments (excl. veterans)," \Federal government
payments to nonprot institutions." The series for workers compensation includes some transfers which are
not from the federal government but we did not attempt to correct for this.
42and is available for our entire sample. It is a component of SPI. The adjustment is equal
to the wage income earned by residents of state i that work in other states (not i) minus
the wage income earned by residents of other states (not i) that work in state i. Thus, it
is the wage component of a state's \foreign" (from other states) net factor income. The
BEA estimates this series by using \Journey to Work" surveys, which are performed by the
Census Bureau.
State Income: State income is calculated starting from the BEA data for SPI, which is
pre-personal income tax but post- all other federal taxes as well as post- social security
contributions and transfers. Therefore, we add to SPI personal and employer social security
contributions and subtract social security transfers. We further add state non-personal taxes,
in order to combine non-cancelling income of the state government and the residents of a
state|the taxes collected by the government of the state are available for consumption by
its residents, possibly in the form of public goods. Finally, we add the interest revenue on
the state's trust funds. The detailed construction of State Income involves a large number
of data sources and a number of imputations; see Asdrubali, Srensen, and Yosha (1996) for
details.
Corporate Retained Earnings: Corporate retained earnings of rms are reported by the
BEA only at the aggregate U.S. level, and are available for our entire sample. We impute
state corporate retained earnings by allocating the aggregate number to each state according
to its share in aggregate personal dividend income.
Historical Dividend and Interest Income: Separate series of personal dividend income
43and personal interest income have been made available to us by Kathy Albetsky from the
BEA for 1929{2000. The BEA publishes the sum of personal dividends, interest, and rent
income by state in 1929{2000.
Population: This series is published by the BEA and is available for our entire sample.
Oil Prices: This series was obtained from the Energy Information Administration in the
U.S. Department of Energy for 1968{2000.
Oil Share: The BEA publishes estimates of the value added in the \Oil and gas extraction"
industry sector by state. \Oil Share" is the percent of this sector in GSP.
Retirement: The Census Bureau publishes age proles of the population by state for 1970{
2000 (unfortunately, we could not obtain the data for 1972). We use the number of people
age 65 and above as our measure of retired persons.
SPI{transfers: SPI minus Federal Transfers.
SPI{commuters' income: SPI minus Commuters' Net Wage Income (Adjustment for
Residence).
GNI (approximation): State Income from Asdrubali, Srensen, and Yosha (1996) plus
Corporate Retained Earnings.
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48Table 1: Change in Net Capital Income Flows: Simulated Data
Dependent Var.: Avg. Out./Inc. T{9 to T minus Avg. Out./Inc. T{19 to T{10
(1) (2)
Output Growth 0.08 0.13
T{19 to T{10 (0.04) (0.03)
Output/Income { {0.44
T{19 to T{10 { (0.10)
Notes: The table reports the results of cross-sectional regressions for 50 \states" on simulated
data. The specication parallels the regressions using actual data reported in Table 5,
columns (1) and (2). A constant was included but is not reported. The coecients are
averages over 200 simulations and standard deviations across the 200 simulations are reported
in parentheses. The simulated data are calibrated to match long-run trends in the aggregate
U.S. economy and state-level output data. The data are simulated for T=100 \years." The
left hand side is the logarithm of the ratio of GDP to GNI averaged over years T{9 to T
minus the ratio of GDP to GNI averaged over years T{19 to T{10. \Output Growth T{19
to T{10" is the logarithm of state GDP in year T{10 minus the logarithm of state GDP in
year T{19. \Output/Income T{19 to T{10" is ratio of GDP to GNI averaged over the years
T{19 to T{10. See the text for parameter values.
49Table 2: Net Capital Income Flows: Simulated Data
Dependent Variable: Log of Average Output/Income T{19 to T
(1) (2)
Log Average Output 0.05 0.09
T{23 to T{19 (0.02) (0.04)
Ownership Share { {0.14
T{61 to T{51 { (0.04)
Notes: The table reports the results of cross-sectional regressions for 50 \states" on simulated
data. The specication parallels the regressions using actual data reported in Table 7,
columns (1) and (2). A constant was included but not reported. The coecients are averages
over 200 simulations and standard deviations across the 200 simulations are reported in
parentheses. The simulated data are calibrated to match long-run trends in the aggregate
U.S. economy and state-level output data. The data are simulated for T=100 \years." The
left-hand side is the logarithm of the ratio of GDP to GNI averaged over years T{19 to T
and \Log Average Output" is the logarithm of the level of GDP averaged over years T{23
to T{19. \Ownership Share T{61 to T{51 " is the logarithm of the share of ownership of
the aggregate capital stock averaged over years T{61 to T{51. See the text for parameter
values.
50Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by State
Avg. Dividend Avg. Interest GSP Growth Avg. GSP Avg. Out/Inc
Inc. 1939 1949 Inc. 1939 1949 1980 1990 1977 1980 1981 2000
Alabama 91.54 163.34 19.22 20,201 0.98
Alaska . . {46.04 63,426 1.63
Arizona 182.46 300.29 3.76 23,502 0.97
Arkansas 64.18 137.50 17.72 19,450 0.97
California 451.10 561.99 15.97 29,642 1.02
Colorado 301.04 437.14 7.11 27,640 1.00
Connecticut 881.53 778.44 34.43 27,657 0.96
Delaware 1846.49 860.02 40.49 28,380 1.21
Florida 404.19 405.22 16.96 21,852 0.88
Georgia 173.98 189.98 26.46 22,624 1.07
Hawaii . . 26.50 29,492 1.06
Idaho 85.37 269.30 4.65 22,958 0.97
Illinois 421.06 498.47 15.41 28,595 0.99
Indiana 214.20 305.85 14.57 24,489 0.98
Iowa 164.52 347.55 6.66 25,988 0.98
Kansas 115.39 299.11 9.14 25,432 0.97
Kentucky 163.19 191.12 13.99 22,493 1.03
Louisiana 155.54 221.39 {10.47 29,678 1.23
Maine 394.94 516.45 24.53 19,435 0.93
Maryland 472.86 568.16 26.80 24,143 0.88
Massachusetts 629.07 675.06 31.38 25,099 0.99
Michigan 307.69 410.73 11.75 26,361 0.95
Minnesota 248.94 380.58 15.16 26,416 0.99
Mississippi 58.18 121.50 12.04 18,594 1.00
Missouri 321.69 379.03 16.96 24,479 0.99
Montana 197.74 342.49 {8.18 24,322 0.94
Nebraska 171.21 337.71 16.69 25,194 1.01
51Descriptive Statistics by State|continued
Avg. Dividend Avg. Interest GSP Growth Avg. GSP Avg. Out/Inc
Inc. 1939 1949 Inc. 1939 1949 1980 1990 1977 1980 1981 2000
Nevada 534.41 549.99 5.48 32,226 1.07
New Hampshire 437.30 533.42 28.75 21,558 0.93
New Jersey 466.87 600.63 34.77 26,183 0.95
New Mexico 179.61 225.41 {2.99 25,088 1.13
New York 726.88 908.47 23.34 28,652 1.02
North Carolina 153.86 152.73 26.11 22,269 1.05
North Dakota 72.11 252.14 {5.13 25,003 1.01
Ohio 374.76 398.71 12.95 25,670 0.98
Oklahoma 150.98 223.83 {8.52 24,848 0.99
Oregon 214.83 432.19 7.31 26,098 0.97
Pennsylvania 423.30 477.04 17.89 24,161 0.92
Rhode Island 583.55 598.69 23.96 21,802 0.92
South Carolina 90.14 155.05 26.03 19,560 1.00
South Dakota 105.65 239.10 21.06 21,935 1.01
Tennessee 137.32 189.95 23.17 21,786 1.02
Texas 171.05 265.15 {3.12 29,488 1.12
Utah 175.30 287.17 8.38 22,802 1.04
Vermont 328.35 473.06 26.39 20,370 0.96
Virginia 230.20 235.47 27.16 24,191 0.99
Washington 232.67 431.22 16.38 27,577 0.99
West Virginia 173.37 186.22 0.95 21,599 0.94
Wisconsin 269.22 438.38 12.12 25,166 0.97
Wyoming 226.85 400.49 {24.22 43,191 1.37
Notes: Avg. Dividend Inc. 1939 1949 and Avg. Interest Inc. 1939 1949 are, respectively,
dividend and interest income per capita in 2000 prices, averaged over 1939 1949. GSP
growth 1980 1990 is the growth rate of GSP per capita, from 1980 to 1990. Avg. GSP
1977 1980 is GSP per capita in 2000 prices, averaged over 1977 1980. Average Out/Inc
1981 2000 is output divided by income (and normalized by U.S. output/income), where
output is Gross State Product (GSP) and income is State Personal Income (SPI), averaged
over 1981 2000.
52Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Mean S.D. Max. Min.
Avg. Output/Income 1981 2000 1.02 0.12 1.63 0.88
Avg. GSP 1977 1980 ($1,000 per capita) 25.8 6.80 63.4 18.6
Avg. Div&Int Inc. 1939 1949 ($1,000 per capita) 0.69 0.46 2.70 0.18
Avg. Oil Share 1977 1980 (percent) 3.00 6.00 22.00 0.00
Retirees/Population 1980 (percent) 11.00 2.00 18.00 3.00
Avg. Out/Inc 1991 2000 minus Avg. Out/Inc 1981 1990 {0.01 0.11 0.16 {0.61
GSP Growth from 1980 to 1990 (percent) 13.68 17.56 37.27 {49.94
Population Growth from 1980 to 1990 (percent) 7.43 9.09 36.47 {8.63
Change in Retirees/Population (percent) 2.40 1.14 6.23 1.08
Avg. Output/Income 1981 1990 1.03 0.17 1.93 0.87
Notes: 47 observations (missing data for Alaska and Hawaii; the outlier Delaware is left out).
Average Output/Income 1981 2000 is output divided by income (and normalized by U.S.
output/income), where output is Gross State Product (GSP) and income is State Personal
Income (SPI), averaged over 1981 2000. Average GSP 1977 1980 is GSP per capita in 2000
prices, averaged over 1977 1980. Average Div&Int Inc. 1939 1949 is the sum of dividend
and interest income per capita in 2000 prices, averaged over 1939 1949. Average Oil Share
1977 1980 is the share of the oil and mineral extraction sectors in GSP by state, averaged
over 1977 1980. Retirees/Population 1980 is the share of retirees in state population in
1980. Avg. Out/Inc 1991 2000 minus Avg. Out/Inc 1981 1990 is the average of the ratio
over 1991 2000 minus the average of the ratio over 1981 1990. GSP Growth is the rate
of GSP per capita growth from 1980 to 1990. Population Growth is the rate of growth
of state population from 1980 to 1990. Change in Retirees/Population is the change in
the number of retirees from 1980 to 1990 divided by average population over 1980{1990.
Average Output/Income 1981 1990 is output divided by income (and normalized by U.S.
output/income), where output is Gross State Product (GSP) and income is State Personal
Income (SPI), averaged over 1981 1990.
53Table 5: Change in Net Capital Income Flows
Dep. Var: Avg. Out/Inc 1991 2000 minus Avg. Out/Inc 1981 1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
States 47 47 47 47
GSP Growth 0.30 0.09 0.08 0.06
from 1980 to 1990 (3.12) (1.81) (1.75) (1.29)
Output/Income { {0.42 {0.42 {0.43
1981 1990 { (6.87) (7.59) (8.95)
Population Growth { { 0.08 0.17
from 1980 to 1990 { { (1.83) (2.71)
Change in Retirees/Population { { { {0.92
from 1980 to 1990 { { { (1.39)
R2 0.41 0.76 0.78 0.78
Notes: 47 observations (missing data for Alaska and Hawaii; the outlier Delaware is left
out). Avg. Out/Inc 1991 2000 minus Avg. Out/Inc 1981 1990 is the average of the ratio
over 1991 2000 minus the average of the ratio in 1981 1990. Output/Income 1981 1990
is the average of the ratio over 1981 1990. GSP Growth is the rate of growth of GSP per
capita from 1980 to 1990. Population Growth is the rate of growth of state population from
1980 to 1990. Change in Retirees/Population is the change in the number of retirees from
1980 to 1990 divided by average population over 1980{1990. A constant is included in all
specications. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics in parentheses.
54Table 6: Change in Net Capital Income Flows: Panel Regressions
Dep. Var: Change in Output/Income
(1) (2) (3)
Sample 1981 2000 1980 2000 1981 2000
GSP Growth 0.06 0.15 0.10
Lagged (1.29) (3.87) (2.12)
Output/Income {0.43 {0.35 {0.32
Lagged (8.95) (12.33) (9.25)
Population Growth 0.17 0.10 0.02
Lagged (2.71) (2.11) (0.32)
Change in Retirees/ {0.92 {0.54 0.06
Population, Lagged (1.39) (1.07) (0.10)
Interval length 10 7 5
Time Periods 1 2 3
Observations 47 94 141
R2 0.78 0.73 0.60
Notes: 47 states used in all regressions (missing data for Alaska and Hawaii and the outlier
Delaware is left out). In each column the denition of a period of the panel changes; it is an
average over a time interval, denoted \Interval length." For example, in column (2) the time-
interval in each period of the panel is 7 years; hence we have 2 periods covering 1987 2000
and a lagged period 1980{1986. The number of observations is 2*47=94. Change in Out-
put/Income is the dierence between the output/income ratio in the current period and the
previous one. GSP Growth Lagged is the total growth of GSP per capita within the previous
period; thus, in column (2) it is the total growth over 7 years. Output/Income Lagged is the
value the output/income ratio in the previous period. Population Growth Lagged is the total
growth of population in the previous period. Change in Retirees/Population is the change
in the number of retirees divided by average population in the previous period. A constant
is included in all specications. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics in parentheses.
55Table 7: Net Capital Income Flows
Dependent Variable: Log of Average Output/Income 1981 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
States 47 47 47 47
Log Average GSP 0.29 0.43 0.29 0.24
1977 1980 (3.12) (5.93) (4.95) (4.41)
Log Average Div&Int { {0.09 {0.06 {0.05
Income 1939 1949 { (5.71) (3.97) (3.35)
Log Average Oil Share { { 0.56 0.54
1977 1980 { { (3.14) (3.47)
Log Retirees/Population { { { {0.11
1980 { { { (2.72)
R2 0.34 0.65 0.73 0.76
Notes: 47 observations (missing data for Alaska and Hawaii; the outlier Delaware is left out).
Average Output/Income 1981 2000 is output divided by income (and normalized by U.S.
output/income), where output is Gross State Product (GSP) and income is State Personal
Income (SPI), averaged over 1981 2000. Average GSP 1977 1980 is GSP per capita in
2000 prices, averaged over 1977 1980. Average Div&Int Income 1939 1949 is the sum of
dividend and interest income per capita in 2000 prices, averaged over 1939 1949. Average
Oil Share 1977 1980 is the share of the oil and mineral extraction sectors in GSP by state,
averaged over 1977 1980; this regressor is transformed to log(1+share) in order to dampen
outliers and avoid zero observations. Retirees/Population 1980 is the share of retirees in
state population in 1980. A constant is included in all specications. Heteroskedasticity
robust t-statistics in parentheses.
56Table 8: Net Capital Income Flows: Other Measures of Income
Dependent Variable: Log of Average Output/Income 1981 2000









Income measure SPI SPI{Fed.Tr. SPI{Commut. Approx. GNI
States 47 47 47 47
Log Average GSP 0.24 0.20 0.13 0.15
1977 1980 (4.41) (3.20) (2.76) (3.20)
Log Average Div&Int {0.05 {0.06 {0.02 {0.06
Income 1939 1949 (3.35) (3.97) (2.13) (4.23)
Log Average Oil Share 0.54 0.65 0.62 0.52
1977 1980 (3.47) (3.53) (4.43) (2.97)
Log Retirees/Population {0.11 {0.04 {0.17 {0.06
1980 (2.72) (0.79) (5.44) (1.47)
R2 0.76 0.72 0.78 0.69
Notes: 47 observations (missing data for Alaska and Hawaii; the outlier Delaware is left
out). Average Output/Income 1981 2000 is output divided by income (and normalized by
U.S. output/income), averaged over 1981 2000, where output is Gross State Product (GSP)
and our income measure varies as follows. Column (1) uses SPI for income. Column (2)
uses SPI{Federal Transfers for Income. Column (3) uses SPI{Adjustment for Residence for
Income. The adjustment for residence is equal to the wage income earned by residents of
state i that work in other states (not i) minus the wage income earned by residents of other
states (not i) that work in state i. The mean of this variable as a percent of SPI for the
sample here (47 states) is 0.7 percent; the standard deviation is 3 percent; the maximum
(Maryland) is 11.4 percent; the minimum (New York) is {3.8 percent. Column (4) uses an
approximation to state-level GNI based on Asdrubali et al. (1996) (see data appendix for
details). This variable is available till 1999 so all the variables in this column are re-dened
accordingly. Average GSP 1977 1980 is GSP per capita in 2000 prices, averaged over
1977 1980. Average Div&Int Income 1939 1949 is the sum of dividend and interest income
per capita in 2000 prices, averaged over 1939 1949. Average Oil Share 1977 1980 is the
share of the oil and mineral extraction sectors in GSP by state, averaged over 1977 1980;
this regressor is transformed to log(1+share) in order to dampen outliers and avoid zero
observations. Retirees/Population 1980 is the share of retirees in state population in 1980. A
constant is included in all specications. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics in parentheses.
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58Figure 2: Output/Income Ratio, Oil Regions
Average Output/Income for Alaska, Louisiana and Wyoming, 
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